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Abstract
This paper explores the rationality of status concerns amongst co-workers and the impact
of such rational status concerns on a firm’s profits. We find that it is individually rational for
agents in a firm to develop and exhibit status concerns. Workers are, by their choices of status
concerns, able to transfer surplus from the the firm to themselves. Further, relative concerns
are shaped by the relative strengths and weaknesses of the workers in the firm. Finally, a firm’s
profit is reduced (relative to the benchmark moral-hazard model) by workers who exhibit such
“endogenous” relative concerns.
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1 Introduction
Why do workers display concerns for status? Agents’ social concerns are usually thought to be a
result of evolutionary pressure or a result of rational behavior.1 Both explanations suggest that
social concerns serve some purpose, and benefit the agents who develop them. However, if workers in
a firm are better off in the presence of status concerns, can a firm benefit from the relative concerns
of its employees? This paper explores the rationality of status concerns amongst co-workers and the
impact of such rational status concerns on a firm’s profits. In particular, it addresses three questions:
(1) Do agents find it in their interests to develop and exhibit status concerns within a firm? (2) If
so, why? That is, what are the factors affecting such choices of status concerns? (3) Finally, what is
the impact of such status concerns on firm profits?
Using a simple linear principal-agent model with one principal and two agents, the paper shows that
workers find it in their interest to develop and exhibit concerns for status in a firm. By their choices of
status concerns, workers are able to transfer surplus from the firm to themselves, thus increasing their
“material utilities”. As expected, workers’ status concerns are influenced by the relative strengths
and weaknesses of the agents in the firm. Differences in characteristics allow workers to tailor their
relative concerns to substitute explicit compensation for potential status rewards. Finally, a firm
cannot exploit its workers’ relative concerns; firm profits are lowered relative to the benchmark case
with atomistic (or egotistical) workers.
The idea that agents have relative social concerns dates back at least to Duesenberry (1949) and
Leibenstein (1950) who drew attention to relative consumption effects on individual behavior. The
literature has since accumulated a lot of evidence for the presence of status concerns and their
impacts on economic behavior in the firm and in the marketplace. See, for instance, Frank (1984 &
1985), Ball and Eckel (1996 & 1998), Ball et. al (2001), Layard (2005), Truyts (2008), Fershtman et
al. (2003) and Fershtman et al. (2008) for evidence from various sources in the field and from the
laboratory.
There is also a substantial body of theoretical work in the agency literature that accounts for
agents’ preferences for status. Some of this work, including Goel and Thakor (2006), Auriol and
Renault (2008), Ku¨pper and Sandner (2008) and Besley and Ghatak (2008), has focused on the
features of optimal contracts in the presence of status concerns. Other works have found that status
concerns can, for instance, lead to higher effort from workers and/or lower wages (Fershtman et
al. 2006, Goel and Thakor 2006 and Besley and Ghatak 2008), justify correlation of workers’ wages
(Fershtman et. al 2003), justify discriminatory contracts (Dhillon and Herzog-Stein 2009) and explain
the hierarchical structure in firms (Dubey and Geanakoplos 2005 and Moldovanu et al. 2007).
While these works do help to explain the observed divergence between agency theory and observed
compensation practices (see Baker, Jensen and Murphy 1988 and Prendergast 1999), they do not
provide an explanation for the presence of such concerns in the first place. “If status is to play a
1See Ball and Eckel (1998), Raub (1990) and Casadesus-Masanell (2004).
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role in economic behavior, then, the benefit of status in economic environments must be explored.”
(Ball and Eckel 1998, p. 501). This paper establishes the rationality of agents’ status concerns in
a firm and thus provides an explanation for their presence. It then shows that such “endogenous”
status concerns generally lower firm profits.
The most common reason attributed to the development of social preferences is evolutionary
pressure. Bernheim (1994) notes that “...individuals who are more highly regarded have greater
opportunities to reproduce. Thus natural selection tends to favor those who are more concerned
about esteem, popularity, or respect” (p. 843). The evolutionary argument is also used by Rotemberg
(1994) to explain the emergence of altruism in the workplace and by Casadesus-Masanell (2004) to
explain the emergence of “Trust in Agency”. See also Rayo and Becker (2007) and Frank (1987).
However, how relative concerns increase one’s standing has not been analyzed.
Bernheim (1994) notes the role played by “behavioral conditioning” (the influence of culture and
upbringing) in the development of an individual’s preference for status. Bowles (1998) highlights the
role of institutions and culture in shaping preferences. However, this approach leaves unanswered
the question of why society favors certain preferences.
Individuals might care about the actions or utilities of others to glean some information that
others might possess. See, for instance Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and Samuelson
(2004). Another possible explanation in an agency setting is career concerns; a worker might care
about the performance of his co-workers if his future earnings are dependent on his current (and
future) relative performance. These explanations assume the presence of incomplete or asymmetric
information or a dynamic decision-making environment. But we observe status concerns even in
static one-shot interactions where the common knowledge assumption can be expected to hold (as in
a moral-hazard game). See, for instance, the experimental results reported in Ball and Eckel (1996)
and Ball et al. (2001). These explanations thus cannot explain why agents care about others in such
interactions.
In this paper, we assume that an agent only cares about his “material utility” (Rabin 1993) or
“intrinsic utility” (Bernheim 1994) and pursue an “instrumental” explanation for the development
of relative social concerns.2 We assume that agents develop concerns for status only if such concerns
increase their material utility. Our model incorporates, and depends crucially on, the hypothesis that
players’ social preferences are context-dependent (see Section 2.3). We model context-dependence
by allowing agents to choose the intensity of their status concerns to suit the decision-making envi-
ronment, i.e., we model status concerns as being endogenous.
The model is a simple static linear principal-agent model with one principal and two heterogeneous
agents and is most closely related to the model in Ku¨pper and Sandner (2008) who allow for agents
who display various forms of social concerns and explore their impact on firm profits. In particular,
they characterize the types of workers (in terms of their social concerns) that a firm would like to
2Postlewaite (1998) provides a detailed discussion of the direct and instrumental approaches to modeling status
concerns on the part of agents.
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hire to maximize its profits. The difference is that we allow for agents who can choose the intensity
of their status concerns in a preliminary stage before the principal-agent game unfolds.
In our model, we find that it is individually rational for agents to develop and display relative
concerns vis-a`-vis their co-workers even in a one-shot interaction. The agents’ choices of relative
concerns actually hurt them, thus forcing the principal to offer a more favorable contract in order
to ensure participation. By developing a concern for status, both agents are able to extract surplus
from the principal thus increasing their material utilities.
In general, any differences in the characteristics of agents leads to their choosing non-zero status
concerns. We find that the “weaker” agent (the agent who is less able or is more risk averse or faces
a more uncertain production process) always chooses to display competitive relative concerns while
the “stronger” agent always chooses to display pro-social concerns similar to altruism.3 Compared
to the standard model with atomistic agents, the weaker agent works harder in an attempt to “catch
up” with the stronger agent while the stronger agent exerts less effort. The weaker agent secures
a contract that offers higher total pay while the stronger worker extracts a contract that requires
lower effort. These two effects together reduce the firm’s profit in equilibrium. Surprisingly, it is the
agents who exploit the substitutability between status and explicit contracts.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and defines important
concepts used in the paper. Section 3 shows the rationality of agents’ choices of status concerns in
a firm and explores the factors affecting agents’ status concerns. Section 4 analyzes the impact of
such concerns on firm profit and establishes the condition under which a firm would prefer to hire a
homogeneous workforce and Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains all the proofs and Appendix
B presents the standard moral-hazard model for purposes of comparison.
2 A Model of Endogenous Status Concerns
We consider a static principal-agent model of moral hazard that takes into account relative social
concerns on the part of agents, i.e., the concern for status. The model is based on the LEN4 model
and is most closely related to Ku¨pper and Sandner (2008).
We assume, for simplicity, that there is only one firm (principal) that can hire only two agents
(from among many) who produce outputs of identical commodities that are both observable. Output
of agent i, qi, is assumed to be a non-deterministic function of his effort, ei, as follows:
qi = ei + i, i = 1, 2, (1)
3Pro-social concerns in this case are similar to, but not the same as, social concerns analyzed by Be´nabou and
Tirole (2006). In our case, pro-social relative concerns simply mean that an agent prefers the other agent to do better
than himself or herself.
4Linear contracts, (Negative) Exponential utility and Normally distributed errors - see Spremann (1987).
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where 1 and 2 are jointly normally distributed with mean vector
[
0
0
]
and variance-covariance
matrix Σ =
[
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ
2
2
]
. Since outputs are observable, they are contractible and the principal offers
wages conditional on outputs. We restrict attention to linear wage schemes5 of the following form:
wi = αi + βiqi + γiqj , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (2)
We only look at the interesting case where the principal needs to hire two agents to make positive
profits. To focus attention on the formation of social concerns, we ignore the issue of bargaining to
split the surplus between the principal and the agents and assume that both agents compete with
other agents for a contract from the principal. The principal can thus make take-it-or-leave-it offers
to the agents.
2.1 Agents
We assume that agent i has a constant absolute risk-aversion utility function of the form
U iA(y) = − exp(−riy), (3)
where ri ≥ 0 is agent i’s coefficient of absolute risk-aversion. Agent i’s cost of effort is given by
ci(ei) =
1
2kie
2
i , where ki is agent i’s ability parameter. His reservation utility, U¯
i, is normalized to
zero. In the LEN model, an agent’s certainty equivalent is equal to the sum of his expected payoff
and his risk-premium (see Bolton and Dewatripont 2005, Chapter 4, Section 2 for a derivation) and
it is thus convenient to work with agents’ certainty equivalents. Hence, we use the terms “expected
utility” and “certainty equivalent” interchangeably from now on.
We also make the following assumption in the rest of the paper to ensure that the equilibrium
contract parameters on own effort are indeed positive.
Assumption 1
4σ2i > kjrj(σ
2
1σ
2
2 − σ212), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
2.1.1 Status
Following Rotemberg (1994) and Casadesus-Masanell (2004), we assume that an agent distinguishes
between material payoffs (the object self) and behavior payoffs (the acting self). The distinction
between material and behavior utilities is crucial. Material utilities are the only utilities that are real
and are the utilities that agents want to maximize while behavior utilities are the preferences agents
5While it is generally accepted the linear contract is suboptimal, there are some possible justifications for its use in
the standard moral-hazard case. See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) and Bose et al. (2007). In this case, we assume
linear wage schemes merely for simplicity.
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act according to, i.e., behavior utility are those preferences that an agent displays to the rest of the
world while material utility are those preferences that really matter to him. Rotemberg (1994) also
draws a distinction between an individual’s “inner self” that is motivated by material utility and his
“outer self” that acts according to behavior utility.
“One common theme in the literature on status is that it is valued not for its own sake, but rather
for the benefits it brings with it” (Ball and Eckel 1998 p. 501.). Thus we assume that agents do
not care about status itself; they merely use it as a tool to maximize their material utilities. This
is in line with the evolutionary argument often used to explain the presence of certain traits and
behaviors. While survival depends on the reproductive success of a species, evolutionary pressure
favors the adoption of certain traits and behaviors that, while they do not have any utility value in
themselves, increase the chances of evolutionary success. The particular trait that we consider in this
model is a concern for one’s performance relative to another’s. Thus, payoffs from status concerns
are a part of an agent’s behavior utility but are not a part of his material utility.
We now formally define these concepts as used in this paper. Since it is convenient to work with
certainty equivalents, we define everything in terms of certainty equivalents. Agent i’s material
payoffs are defined as follows
Material Payoffsi = wi −
1
2
kie
2
i , i = 1, 2. (4)
An agent’s utility from material payoffs is thus
U iA = − exp{−ri(αi + βiei + γiej −
kie
2
i
2
+ (βii + γij))}
with associated certainty equivalent
CEAi = αi + βiei + γiej − kie
2
i
2
− ri
2
(β2i σ
2
i + 2βiγiσ12 + γ
2
i σ
2
j ), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
In addition to material payoffs, we assume that agents have social concerns, Ri, vis-a-vis each
other.6 The literature on social concerns has found evidence (mostly experimental) of many forms of
social concerns - altruism, reciprocity, fairness and competitive concerns (see Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000
and Charness and Rabin 2002, for instance). It is possible that agents are altruistic in a particular
context (such as fund-raisers for flood victims) while they are competitive in other contexts (such
as a patent race). By restricting attention to the firm and then only to agents within the firm, we
identify the people that an agent is likely to interact with - his co-workers. It is then natural to think
of agents within a firm as competing with (or against) each other.
Therefore, we assume that an agent makes interpersonal comparisons with other agents in the
6There has been some work on agents who compare themselves to the principal instead. See, for instance, Sandner
(2008). When an agent has social concerns vis-a-vis the principal, it is also possible to think of trust relationships
- see Casadesus-Masanell (2004) and Ramalingam and Rauh (2008). In this paper, we only focus on relative social
concerns that agents have for each other.
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firm. We assume that agents have relative concerns of the following form:
Ri = qi − qj . (5)
Following earlier work in the literature, we refer to such relative interpersonal comparisons as concerns
for status. In this case, since agents only compare themselves with other agents in the same firm,
Ri thus captures a concern for “local” status (see Fershtman et. al. 2003 & 2006). Status defined
this way is zero-sum, i.e., Ri +Rj = 0; an agent can gain status only at the expense of the other.
In the status literature, it is common to define status as being derived from the difference in
agents’ wages, wi − wj . We deviate from such a specification for the following reasons. First, wage
information is not often made public, even within a firm. Thus, it is unrealistic to suppose that
agents base their decision on unobservable variables.
Second, it is possible to interpret the difference in agents’ outputs as the difference in the hierar-
chical levels they occupy. It is not hard for an employee to find out the job titles of his co-workers.
Assume that a title is granted to an agent if his output falls in a pre-determined range associated
with that title. So, if an employee could observe the job title of a co-worker, he could infer the range
in which the output of the co-worker in question falls.7 To interpret status concerns as difference
in hierarchical levels, we would, technically, need to specify status as the difference in the threshold
output levels for each agent’s hierarchical position. The above specification is a simplification - we
essentially assume that the firm’s mapping of outputs to hierarchical positions results in a perfectly
fine partition of the employees into hierarchical levels, i.e., assume that each output level is in a
“class of its own”.8 In such an instance, by observing job titles that the firm makes public (assume
this for simplicity), an agent can perfectly infer his co-worker’s output. It is thus feasible to measure
status as the difference in outputs. Status defined in this particular way makes it possible to interpret
an agent as deriving status from being higher up in the hierarchy than his co-worker, a reasonably
realistic and commonplace phenomenon.
Third, status is commonly thought of as being granted by outside observers. Indeed, symbols
such as medals or trophies have no value in themselves and merely serve to inform outsiders of a
victory. If status is to be granted by outsiders, it is essential that there be a signal that is readily
and easily observable. In the absence of publicly observable wage information, job titles serve just
such a purpose. The current specification of status thus allows status to be derived from, as one
might expect, the social sphere of life. Once again, the identification of job titles with output levels
instead of some threshold output level is merely a simplification.
Finally, as mentioned in Ga¨chter et al. (2008), the empirical evidence for significant impacts
of “pay comparison information” alone on employee behavior is “at best weak”. While they note
7This, of course, relies on the assumption that the firm announces and commits to a particular mapping of outputs
to hierarchical positions that the agent can then invert.
8Moldovanu et. al (2007) and Dubey and Geanakoplos (2005) identify instances when such a fine partition of
employees is optimal. However, since they talk about partitioning employees, their specification is necessarily discrete.
We make the continuity assumption simply for convenience.
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that combinations of pay and effort comparison information might significantly impact individual
behavior, they argue that effort comparison information may influence behavior independent of pay
comparison information. We use effort comparison alone (in our model, expected output is equal to
effort).
This model ignores issues pertaining to comparisons within and across social groups. For instance,
it can be argued that the average worker does not compare himself with Bill Gates. By restricting
attention to local status, we have abstracted away from this complication. All workers are assumed
to belong to the same (or similar) social group(s).
Given the above definition of Ri, agent i’s behavior payoffs are given by the sum of his material
payoffs and the payoff derived from status:
Behavior Payoffsi = wi −
1
2
kie
2
i + δiRi, i = 1, 2, (6)
where δi ∈ R is the importance agent i attaches to status. By allowing for δi 6= δj , we assume that
the importance attached to status can be different for each agent. Indeed, experiments testing for
social preferences find substantial individual variations in, for example, offers made by a Proposer
in a Trust Game (see, for example, Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000). Note that such a specification allows
for the possibility that status payoff within the firm is not zero-sum, i.e., it is possible that δi 6= δj .
Thus, while status is zero-sum, status payoff within the firm need not be.
Generally, agent i could choose how much importance to give to monetary payoff (wi) in addition
to choosing the importance of status payoffs. The above specification captures this general possibility
too. By not specifying another coefficient on wi we have, in effect, normalized the weight on wi to
be unity. We can thus interpret δi as the relative weight agent i puts on his status payoff.
Note that we allow an agent to have negative status concerns. If δi < 0, agent i actually prefers
agent j to have a higher status in the firm. Since there is evidence of many kinds of social concerns,
there is no reason, a priori, to expect that all agents will have the same kinds of social concerns (see
Ku¨pper and Sandner 2008). By allowing δi < 0, we also allow for “altruistic” agents within the firm.
Agent i is (usually) defined to be altruistic if he puts positive weight, in his preferences, on agent
j’s outcome without regard to relative outcomes. In this case, δi < 0 implies that agent i puts a
positive weight on agent j’s outcome. However, he also cares about his relative standing. Hence,
strictly speaking, δi < 0 does not make agent i altruistic. We refer to an agent with negative status
concerns (δi < 0) as an agent with “pro-social” relative concerns and an agent with positive status
concerns (δi > 0) as an agent with “competitive” relative concerns.
9 For the sake of simplicity and
convenience, however, we refer to any form of social concerns in this model as concerns for status,
with the understanding that such concerns can be competitive or pro-social.
9See footnote 3.
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Agent i’s utility from behavior payoffs is given by
U iA = − exp{−ri(wi −
kie
2
i
2
+ δi(qi − qj))}
= − exp{−ri[αi + βiei + γiej − kie
2
i
2
+ δi(ei − ej)
+ (βi + δi)i + (γi − δi)j ]}, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
with associated certainty equivalent given by
CEAi = αi + βiei + γiej − kie
2
i
2
+ δi(ei − ej)− riVi
2
, (7)
where Vi = (βi + δi)
2σ2i + 2(βi + δi)(γi − δi)σ12 + (γi − δi)2σ2j . We define an agent’s behavior utility
to be the certainty equivalent from his behavior payoffs.
However, we draw a distinction between material utility and the certainty equivalent from material
payoffs. We define material utility, MAi, to be the certainty equivalent from material payoffs plus the
expected risk-premium from status concerns. Thus material utility is just behavior utility without
expected status.
MAi = αi + βiei + γiej − kie
2
i
2
− riVi
2
(8)
where Vi = (βi + δi)
2σ2i + 2(βi + δi)(γi − δi)σ12 + (γi − δi)2σ2j . Note that the risk-premium term Vi
includes the direct effect of agent i’s status concerns δi, i.e., Vi is a function of δi, while the certainty
equivalent of an agent’s material payoffs does not contain δi or δj . By taking the direct effect of δi
into account, we assume that there is a direct and real cost to displaying status concerns in terms of
increased exposure to risk.
Below are the formal definitions of these concepts.
Definition 1 An agent’s behavior utility, CEAi, is defined as the certainty equivalent of the
expected utility from his behavior payoffs, as given in (7).
Definition 2 The material utility of agent i, MAi, is defined as the certainty equivalent of the
expected utility he receives from his material payoffs plus the risk imposed by his concern for status,
as given in (8).
2.2 Principal
The principal is assumed to be risk-neutral and his revenue is assumed to be equal to output, q1+q2.
His certainty equivalent is thus given by
CEP = e1 + e2 − (α1 + β1e1 + γ1e2)− (α2 + β2e2 + γ2e1). (9)
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The principal’s reservation expected profit is assumed to be zero. His decision problem is to design
contracts and to choose effort levels to maximize the above objective subject to individual rationality
and incentive compatibility constraints for the two agents.
2.3 Equilibrium and Efficient Status Concerns
In order to explore the “economic value of status” (Ball and Eckel 1998), we make the assumption
that players’ social preferences are context-dependent. There is experimental and field evidence
that suggests that preferences depend on the environment. Bowles (1998) and Zizzo (2003) present
evidence from various sources that suggest that preferences are influenced by culture, institutions
and other environmental factors. Sobel (2007) finds that “Markets Make People Appear Selfish”.
Palacios-Huerta and Santos (2004) construct a theoretical model where risk-aversion parameters are
“endogenous to market arrangements” (p. 617) and present empirical evidence of such “endogeneity”.
See de Oliveira et al. (2009), Ramalingam and Rauh (2008) and Kapteyn et al. (1980) for further
references.
Here, we focus on only one institution and assume that social concerns are nevertheless “endoge-
nous”. Based on earlier experimental studies, we posit that players’ social preferences depend on the
characteristics of the other players they interact with. For instance, Levine (1998) presents experi-
mental evidence to support his claim that “In general, player’s regard for one another may depend
on who the opponent is,...” (p. 598). Eckel and Grossman (1996) find that student subjects in
a dictator game experiment allocate more to a charity than to anonymous student subjects. In a
series of ultimatum game experiments, Eckel and Grossman (2001) find that offers from women are
more likely to be accepted. Such studies suggest that agents’ social preferences depend on the other
players in the game.
In the absence of convincing evidence, we do not claim that individuals’ preferences are unstable.
We merely work under the assumption that “preferences are stable, but are elicited to the extent that
the particular institution allows” (Ramalingam and Rauh 2008, p. 2), i.e., that different preferences
can be revealed in different contexts. However, it is not clear how contexts affect preferences. Thus,
for modeling convenience, we allow agents in our model to choose the intensity of their social concerns.
In arguing that an agent can choose how important to make such concerns, we argue that agent i
can choose δi.
Following the method outlined in Raub (1990), Rotemberg (1994) and Casadesus-Masanell (2004),
we allow agents to choose their own concerns for status to maximize their “material utilities”. Allow-
ing preferences to be endogenous is merely a modeling tool that captures the hypothesis that agents’
social concerns are affected by the context in which their decision is made, i.e., by the characteris-
tics of the individuals they interact with (relative to their own). Such “endogeneity” of preferences
captures rationality and rational behavior on the part of agents. As Raub (1990) notes, “choices of
effective preferences are a result of the rational pursuit of natural interests” (p. 70). In the rest of
the paper, we refer to agent i’s choice of δi as his “choice of status concerns”.
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In the model that we consider in this paper, we make the usual common knowledge assumption.
Thus, an agent knows the environmental conditions in which he will make his subsequent effort choice
when he chooses his status concerns, i.e., he knows the production processes of both agents. Further,
he also knows his own characteristics and those of his co-worker, i.e., he knows his own risk-aversion
and effort-cost parameters and those of his co-worker’s. (Of course, common knowledge also implies
that he knows that his co-worker knows these parameters too and that he knows that he knows and
so on.) Thus, he need not exert any effort (and incur any cost) to inform himself of the parameters
of the game. Lastly, we assume, as is standard in all economic models, that an agent faces no cost to
using his cognitive abilities, i.e., being rational comes naturally to an agent. Therefore, we assume,
following Casadesus-Masanell (2004), that agents can choose their status concerns costlessly.
Agents choose their status concerns in a preliminary stage prior to the principal-agent game,
i.e., we add a stage before the principal-agent game where the agents choose their status concerns
(Rotemberg 1990 and Casadesus-Masanell 2004). We define equilibrium status concerns as the
status concerns chosen costlessly by the agents to maximize their material utilities in a strategic
game before the principal-agent game. However, the agents’ choices are subject to the constraint
that the principal’s expected profit be non-negative. If the principal’s expected profit is negative, he
will shut down and the agency relationship breaks down.
Definition 3 The equilibrium status concerns are a Nash equilibrium of the first-stage strategic
game played between the two agents described by {{1, 2}, Ai,MAi}2i=1, where A1 = A2 = R is the
strategy set of the players and MAi is the material utility of agent i. These choices are subject to
the constraint that the principal’s expected profit be non-negative.
The equilibrium status concerns enable us to make statements about the value of status to the
agents alone. To explore the value to the firm as a whole (the principal and the two agents), we
characterize the (socially) efficient status concerns. We begin with another definition.
Definition 4 Material surplus, MS, is defined as the sum of the expected material payoffs of the
principal (profits) and the material utilities of each agent. MS = CEP +MA1 +MA2.
Thus, material surplus is measured as follows:
MS = e1 + e2 − k1e
2
1
2
− r1V1
2
− k2e
2
2
2
− r2V2
2
. (10)
We define the efficient status concerns as those that maximize the total material surplus in the firm,
given the optimal incentive contracts offered by the principal and the effort levels chosen by the
agents. Note that the moral hazard problem is still present. Thus, the efficient status concerns are
those that are constrained efficient.
Definition 5 The efficient status concerns are those that maximize the material surplus within
the firm.
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By looking at the efficient status concerns, we can investigate if status concerns have any social value
within the firm, i.e., we can see if there are any status concerns that increase the surplus within the
firm above the moral-hazard benchmark. The maximum possible surplus generated by the efficient
status concerns also serve as an upper bound on the firm’s profits. This upper bound will be useful
in determining the ideal status concerns from the point of view of the principal.
2.4 Timing in the Game
The setting is a principal-agent game with one preliminary stage where the agents choose their status
concerns rationally. Once status concerns are chosen, the principal’s problem is one of designing the
optimal linear contract given the agents’ concerns for status. Each agent’s problem is to choose his
effort level given the contract offered and the status concerns chosen by him and his co-worker. The
timing in the game is as follows:
1. The agents play a strategic game between themselves to costlessly choose their concerns for
status to maximize their material payoffs, subject to the constraint that the principal’s expected
profit be non-negative.
2. The principal offers contracts (α1, β1, γ1) and (α2, β2, γ2).
3. Agents decide whether or not to accept the contracts. If agents accept the contracts, effort
levels are chosen and payoffs are realized.
As is standard in principal-agent models, we solve the game by backward induction. The principal
can look forward to the third stage of the game and solve for the agents’ effort choices. In the second
stage, the principal solves for the optimal contracts given the agents’ choices of effort. In the first
stage, the agents look forward and calculate the contracts chosen by the principal and choose their
concerns for status given the contracts chosen by the principal.
Note the role played by truthful revelation and commitment. Once an agent chooses and displays
his status concerns, he is committed to his truthful announcement. This assumption is based on
studies that argue that falsification of preferences is costly and also reflects knowledge captured in
adages such as “Old habits die hard”. Once an agent’s preferences are fixed, he finds it difficult
to hide and/or change them. Since the principal believes (due to truthful revelation) the agents’
announcements of their status concerns, he has no choice but to believe they will act according to
their stated behavior utility functions, i.e., the principal cannot commit to a contract before agents
choose their social concerns.
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3 Choices of Status Concerns
As defined earlier, the agent’s behavior utility is given by (7) where the risk-premium is as defined
earlier. These are the preferences the agent acts according to and his problem is to maximize (7)
with respect to ei. The solution to this problem is
10:
ei =
{
βi+δi
ki
if βi + δi ≥ 0
0 if βi + δi < 0
. (11)
Note that ei is increasing in βi and δi.
The principal’s problem is to maximize CEP with respect to the contract parameters subject to
the Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraints and the binding Individual Rationality (IR) constraints,
i.e.,
max
{αi,βi,γi,ei}2i=1
CEP = e1 + e2 − (α1 + β1e1 + γ1e2)− (α2 + β2e2 + γ2e1)
subject to
ei =
βi + δi
ki
, i = 1, 2,
αi + βiei + γiej−kie
2
i
2
+ δi(ei − ej)− riVi
2
= 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Note that we have assumed that the principal prefers positive effort from both agents. We assume
this in everything that follows. Substituting in the constraints (at the optimum, the IR constraints
bind), we can solve for the optimal contract parameters11
βi = −δi +
(1 + δi − δj)σ2j
ψj
and γi = δi − (1 + δi − δj)σ12
ψj
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j,
where
ψi ≡ σ2i + kjrj(σ21σ22 − σ212) > 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (12)
To sign the above expressions, we have used the fact that σ21σ
2
2 −σ212 > 0 (Σ is a variance-covariance
matrix and is hence positive definite). α1 and α2 are chosen so that the IR constraints bind.
12
∂βi
∂δi
=
−kiri(σ21σ22 − σ212)
ψj
< 0 and
∂βi
∂δj
=
−σ2j
ψj
< 0.
Note that status and explicit incentives are substitutes from the point of the view of the principal.
∂γi
∂δi
=
ψj − σ12
ψj
and
∂γi
∂δj
=
σ12
ψj
.
10CEAi is strictly concave in ei and the first-order condition is therefore necessary and sufficient. The first-order
approach is, therefore, valid.
11After substituting in the constraints, CEP is strictly concave and the first order conditions (FOC) are, thus,
necessary and sufficient.
12This reflects the implicit assumption that all parties have “sufficient” funds, an assumption that is made through-
out this paper.
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Thus, the principal can use lower incentives in the presence of status concerns. Also, note that status
justifies the use of Relative Performance Evaluation even when the outputs of the two agents are
unrelated, i.e., when σ12 = 0, a result that was emphasized very early on in the status literature. For
instance, see Fershtman et. al (2003) and Goel and Thakor (2006). Also, incentives are decreasing
in risk-aversion parameters and the variability of production, i.e., the risk-reward tradeoff still holds.
For more details on the optimal contract in the presence of status concerns, see Goel and Thakor
(2006) and Ku¨pper and Sandner (2008).
The agents’ effort levels are given by:
e1 =
(1 + δ1 − δ2)σ22
k1ψ2
and e2 =
(1− δ1 + δ2)σ21
k2ψ1
. (13)
3.1 Equilibrium Status Concerns
In equilibrium, the status concerns δ1 and δ2 are chosen by the agents to maximize their material
utilities in a strategic game between themselves, given the contract parameters. As defined above,
MAi = αi + βiei + γiej − kie
2
i
2
− riVi
2
= −δi(ei − ej),
where the second equality uses the fact that the contract is chosen so that agent i’s IR constraint
binds. Thus, an agent’s material utility is just the negative of his expected status payoff. Put
another way, MAi = δi(ej − ei) = δiRj . This is due to the zero-sum nature of status in this game
(Ri +Rj = 0); one agent’s status gain is equal to the other agent’s status loss.
When status concerns are endogenous, the natural first question is if it is rational for agents to
display/exhibit them. Note that we use the terms “display” and “exhibit” since the social concerns
are only part of an agent’s behavior utility, i.e., the utility function that he “displays” to the employer.
Thus, by choosing a non-zero value of δ, a worker “displays” to his employer that he cares about
status. The terms are not to be confused with the situation where an agent is endowed with a certain
value of δ but chooses to display another value. The first result establishes the individual rationality
of such status concerns.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium Status Concerns
(i) In general, agents choose to display non-zero concerns for status in the firm.
(ii) One agent chooses to display competitive concerns while the other chooses to display pro-social
concerns.
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In equilibrium, the material utilities of both agents are higher than in the benchmark case,
MA1 = MA2 =
[k1σ
2
1ψ2 − k2σ22ψ1]2
9k1k2ψ1ψ2[k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
> 0 = MAB1 = MA
B
2 ,
where the B superscript denotes the corresponding values from the benchmark model with no status
concerns (see Appendix B). Both agents thus find it individually rational to display or exhibit
concerns for status in the firm; status concerns are “instrumental” in raising their material utilities.
Proposition 1 thus provides a rationale for the development of status concerns in a competitive
setting. The equilibrium status concerns are
δ1 =
k1σ
2
1ψ2 − k2σ22ψ1
3 [k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
and δ2 =
−k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ22ψ1
3 [k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
. (14)
Note that δ1 = −δ2, i.e., one agent chooses to display competitive concerns while the other chooses
to display pro-social concerns. The equilibrium contract parameters are
β1 =
k1σ
2
1ψ2(5σ
2
2 − ψ2) + k2σ22ψ1(σ22 + ψ2)
3ψ2 [k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
, β2 =
k2σ
2
2ψ1(5σ
2
1 − ψ1) + k1σ21ψ2(σ21 + ψ1)
3ψ1 [k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
(15)
γ1 =
k1σ
2
1ψ2(ψ2 − 5σ12)− k2σ22ψ1(ψ2 + σ12)
3ψ2 [k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
, γ2 =
k2σ
2
2ψ1(ψ1 − 5σ12)− k1σ21ψ2(ψ1 + σ12)
3ψ1 [k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
,(16)
where βi > 0 by Assumption 1. The agents’ effort levels are
e1 =
σ22 [k2σ
2
2ψ1 + 5k1σ
2
1ψ2]
3k1ψ2 [k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
> 0 and e2 =
σ21 [k1σ
2
1ψ2 + 5k2σ
2
2ψ1]
3k2ψ1 [k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
> 0. (17)
Part (i) of Proposition 1 also holds under more general specifications. In particular, it holds even
if the agents are restricted to choosing non-negative values of δ.13 It also holds when the number
of agents is increased. Finally, it also holds under a certain specification of uncertainty. The result
obtains if we assume that each agent knows only his own characteristics and that the principal knows
the characteristics of both agents but each agent knows that the other’s, for instance, cost of effort is
“low” or “high” with probability pL and pH = 1− pL respectively. However, we stick to the current
specification for simplicity and because it allows for sharper contrasts between the agents in all the
results (as in (ii) of Proposition 1).
Proposition 1 also allows us to make statements about the relative importance of status to an
agent. In equilibrium, we have |δi| = |δj | < 1. Thus, the weight on (or importance given to)
status payoff is less than unity, i.e., agents put less weight on status payoffs relative to monetary
payoffs (recall the interpretation of δi as the relative importance attached to status). We thus have
a corollary to Proposition 1.
Corollary 1 Relative Importance of Status Concerns
Agents care more about monetary payoffs than they do about status payoffs.
13In this case, part (ii) of Proposition 2 becomes: (ii) One agent chooses to display competitive concerns while the
other chooses to display no relative concerns (zero status concerns).
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This finding is in line with expectations. Monetary payoffs directly increase material payoffs while
status concerns increase material payoffs only indirectly through their effect on wages or effort choices.
Thus, an agent gives more importance to monetary payoffs than he does to status payoffs.14
From the equilibrium status concerns, we have
δi > 0(⇒ δj < 0) ⇔ kiσ2i ψj > kjσ2jψi.
Under this condition, we have ei < ej in equilibrium. Thus, in equilibrium, agent i receives a
negative expected status payoff (δi(ei − ej) < 0). Since δj < 0, agent j also receives a negative
expected status payoff (δj(ej − ei) < 0). The negative expected status payoff reduces an agent’s
behavior utility. When the principal chooses the contract parameters, he has to ensure that the
agents’ behavior utility is at least zero to ensure participation. Since, in equilibrium, the behavior
utility of the agents is reduced by their choices of status concerns, the principal is forced to increase
the material utility15 of the agents above zero (MABi = 0) in order to induce them to enter the agency
relationship. Thus, agents successfully design their “acting self” preferences to extract surplus from
the principal and increase their material utilities above zero, i.e., it is individually rational for agents
to display concerns for status within the firm even in a one-shot game.
The fact that agents display opposing status concerns derives from the fact (assumption) that
status received by agent i, Ri, is just the negative of the status received by agent j, i.e., one agent
always gets negative status. The only way both agents can still receive positive material utility
is for them to have opposing concerns for status, i.e., sign(δ1) = − sign(δ2). Opposing status
concerns allow both agents to derive negative expected status payoffs, thus forcing the principal to
increase the material utilities of both agents. The fact that the agents’ status concerns are equal in
magnitude merely reflects the fact that their problems are mirror-images (!) of one another. Thus, in
equilibrium, one agent chooses to display competitive social concerns while the other agents chooses
to display pro-social concerns.
By ensuring that his expected status payoff is negative, an agent precludes the possibility that
the principal can rely on status payoffs to serve as an additional incentive for higher effort. Since
an agent’s utility is decreased by his choice of social concerns, the principal is, in fact, forced to rely
even more heavily on explicit contractual parameters. Analysis of the factors influencing an agent’s
choice of status concerns identifies the contractual parameters that agents are able to influence. The
following subsection carries out this analysis.
3.2 Factors Affecting Status Concerns
From the expressions for the equilibrium status concerns, it is easy to see that agents’ choices of
social concerns are influenced by the environmental conditions and by the characteristics of both
14This result could be due to the fact that we do not allow for wealth accumulation in the model. It is conceivable
that if an agent has already amassed substantial wealth, he will focus more on status payoff.
15Recall that behavior utility is just material utility plus the expected status payoff.
16
agents as hypothesized. However, without further assumptions, it is not possible to disentangle the
effects of each of these parameters on an agent’s choice of status. Therefore, in the analysis that
follows, we assume that all factors are equal across both agents except for the factor of interest.
Formally, the environmental conditions in this model are the variability of the production pro-
cesses (σ21 , σ
2
2 and σ12) and the agent characteristics are the risk-aversion and effort-cost parameters
(r1, k1, r2 and k2). It can also be seen that σ12 plays no significant role in the determination of
status concerns; at best, it plays the same role for both agents. Thus, for simplicity, we assume that
σ12 = 0, i.e., that the agents’ production processes are independent, in what follows.
16 Under this
assumption, the equilibrium status concerns are given by
δ1 =
k1(1 + k1r1σ
2
1)− k2(1 + k2r2σ22)
3[k1(1 + k1r1σ21) + k2(1 + k2r2σ
2
2)]
(18)
δ2 =
−k1(1 + k1r1σ21) + k2(1 + k2r2σ22)
3[k1(1 + k1r1σ21) + k2(1 + k2r2σ
2
2)]
. (19)
3.2.1 Production Process
To isolate the effects of the production processes, we assume that r1 = r2 = r > 0 and k1 = k2 =
k > 0, i.e., that agents are identical in all respects. The equilibrium status concerns are now
δ1 =
kr(σ21 − σ22)
3[2 + kr(σ21 + σ
2
2)]
and δ2 =
kr(σ22 − σ21)
3[2 + kr(σ21 + σ
2
2)]
.
Proposition 2 Effect of Production Uncertainty on Equilibrium Status Concerns
(i) All else equal, the agent who faces the more (less) uncertain production process chooses to display
competitive (pro-social) concerns within the firm.
(ii) All else equal, the status concerns of an agent are increasing in own production uncertainty and
decreasing in the production uncertainty of the other agent.
(iii) All else equal, the material utilities of agents are increasing in the difference between the pro-
duction uncertainties of their two tasks.
3.2.2 Agent Characteristics
To focus attention on agent characteristics, we assume that σ21 = σ
2
2 = σ
2 > 0, i.e., the agents face
the same production process. We temporarily relax the assumptions on risk-aversion and effort-cost
parameters.
Risk-Aversion Here, we further assume that the agents’ effort-costs are the same in order to
isolate the effects of risk-aversion, i.e., we assume that k1 = k2 = k > 0. In this case, the agents’
16When σ12 6= 0, no clear conclusion can be reached. In particular, it is not possible to disentangle the effects of
the individual factors.
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choices of status concerns simplify to
δ1 =
kσ2(r1 − r2)
3[2 + kσ2(r1 + r2)]
and δ2 =
kσ2(r2 − r1)
3[2 + kσ2(r1 + r2)]
.
Proposition 3 Effect of Risk-Aversion on Equilibrium Status Concerns
(i) All else equal, the agent who is more (less) risk-averse chooses to display competitive (pro-social)
concerns within the firm.
(ii) All else equal, the status concerns of an agent are increasing in own risk-aversion and decreasing
in the risk-aversion of the other agent.
(iii) All else equal, the material utilities of agents are increasing in the difference between their
coefficients of risk-aversion.
Effort Cost Interpreting higher effort costs as lower ability enables us to make statements about
how equilibrium status concerns are affected by relative abilities of agents. To this end, we assume
that r1 = r2 = r > 0 and allow k1 and k2 to be variable. We still assume that σ
2
1 = σ
2
2 = σ
2 > 0.
Now, the equilibrium status concerns are given by
δ1 =
(k1 − k2)[1 + rσ2(k1 + k2)]
3[(k1 + k2) + rσ2(k21 + k
2
2)]
and δ2 =
(k2 − k1)[1 + rσ2(k1 + k2)]
3[(k1 + k2) + rσ2(k21 + k
2
2)]
.
Proposition 4 Effect of Ability on Equilibrium Status Concerns
(i) All else equal, the agent with the lower (higher) ability chooses to display competitive (pro-social)
concerns within the firm.
(ii) All else equal, the status concerns of an agent is increasing in own effort cost and decreasing in
the effort cost of the other agent.
(iii) All else equal, the material utilities of both agents are increasing in the difference in effort cost
between the two agents.
3.2.3 Discussion
For purposes of exposition, define agent i to be the “weaker” (“stronger”) agent if he faces a more
(less) uncertain production process (σ2i > (<)σ
2
j ) or if he is more (less) risk-averse (ri > (<)rj) or
if he faces a higher (lower) effort cost (ki > (<)kj). The above propositions state that the weaker
agent chooses to display stronger competitive concerns than does the stronger agent. In fact, only
the weaker agent chooses competitive concerns. This result is counter-intuitive; one would normally
expect the stronger agent to be more competitive. If agents were to care about winning, it would
seem that the agent more likely to win would care more about status since that would increase his
utility. The above results suggest otherwise. An understanding of this “puzzle” also make clear the
process by which the agents extract surplus from the principal by their choices of status concerns.
The mismatch between the weaker (competitive) and the stronger (pro-social) agents ensures that
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the expected output of the stronger agent is greater than that of the weaker agent (recall that
δi > 0(⇒ δj < 0) ⇔ ei < ej). Thus, the weaker agent expects a status loss while the stronger
agent expects a status gain in equilibrium. The weaker agent acts competitively since his expected
status loss forces the principal to compensate him for the loss. The stronger agent does not act
competitively since his expected status gain will allow the principal to substitute status for explicit
incentives that can increase his material utility; if the stronger worker were to develop competitive
concerns, he would signal to the firm that his utility is increased by his status gain from winning,
thus allowing the firm to reduce his wage payment. Instead he designs his social preferences in such
a way that he too gets a negative expected status payoff.
The weaker agent works harder in equilibrium relative to the benchmark case (δi > 0 implies
that ei > e
B
i , where the B superscript denotes a value from the benchmark model with no status
concerns).17 He has to be compensated for this and thus receives a higher wage in equilibrium
relative to the benchmark wage; δi > 0 ⇒ wi > wBi . The increase in the wage payment more than
compensates for his increased effort cost. Thus, the agent with positive status concerns is able to
extract a “significantly” higher wage payment from the principal that then increases his material
utility above zero.
The opposite is true for the stronger agent. The stronger agent works less in equilibrium but
also receives a lower wage relative to the benchmark wage.18 His reduction in effort cost more
than compensates for the reduction in his wage. The agent with negative status concerns is able to
influence the principal to offer a contract that requires “significantly” lower effort, thus increasing
his material utility above zero.19
These results are similar to the findings of Bandiera et al. (2008). Using data on productivity
and social networks of workers in a firm, they find that compared to when she has no ties to her
co-workers, a worker exerts less effort if she is more able than her friends and exerts more effort if
she is less able than her friends. In our analysis, we have effectively assumed that all workers are
“friends”; we have abstracted away from the worker’s choice of reference group.
Thus, both agents are able to force the principal to offer them more favorable contracts (relative
to the benchmark case). Contrary to what one might expect, it is the agents who exploit the
substitutability of status and explicit contracts. The principal is forced to rely more heavily on
explicit incentives (in the case of the weaker agent) or to accept lower effort (in the case of the
stronger agent); the principal is forced to substitute contractual parameters for the expected status
loss faced by agents. The principal is thus forced to transfer some of the surplus to the agents.
This result also explains why an agent’s status concerns are increasing as, all else equal, his relative
weakness increases (parts (ii) and (iii) of Propositions 2 through 4). As an agent’s relative weakness
17The condition that ensures that δi > 0 also ensures that e
B
i < e
B
j . Hence, it is possible to simultaneously have
ei > e
B
i , ej < e
B
j and ei − ej < 0, as is indeed the case.
18We get the result that the stronger agent’s effort is reduced relative to the benchmark model since we allow for
negative status concerns.
19As an aside, the agent with positive (negative) status concerns faces a higher (lower) risk-premium in equilibrium
relative to the benchmark case.
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increases, the amount by which his expected output falls short of the other agent’s increases if the
agent is weaker. By increasing his concern for status (choosing a greater positive number) he can
increase the expected status loss that is perceived by the principal, increasing the compensation that
he can receive from the principal and thus his material utility. The opposite is true when an agent’s
relative strength increases - by decreasing his concern for status (choosing a lower negative number),
the agent increases his expected status loss from producing more than the other agent. We thus have
a corollary to the above propositions.
Corollary 2 Agents’ Preference for Workforce Diversity
Agents’ material utilities are increasing in workforce diversity, i.e., workers would like to work in a
(infinitely) diverse workforce.
4 Implications for Firm Profits
A natural follow-up question, indeed one that has been asked often, is the question of the impact of
status concerns on firm profits. This is the focus of this section. In order to answer this question, we
take a slightly indirect route. We first calculate the maximum possible surplus that can be generated
within the firm in the presence of status concerns. More precisely, we solve for the “efficient status
concerns”. If the firm were able to appropriate the entire surplus generated within the firm, the
“efficient surplus” would then be an upper bound on the profits that the firm can hope to make.
Statements on the impact on firm profits are made in relation to this upper bound.
The results of the previous section make clear that agents choose status concerns to exploit the
differences in their characteristics. The following results are, therefore, necessarily a result of such
workforce “diversity”. Define a diverse workforce as one where workers differ in at least one char-
acteristics, i.e., r1 6= r2 or k1 6= k2 or σ21 6= σ22 . The following result calculates this upper bound on
firm profits and shows that a firm’s profits are always reduced (relative to the benchmark model) by
hiring a diverse workforce, as suggested by the results of the previous section.
Proposition 5 Efficient Concerns for Status
With a diverse workforce,
(i) The (constrained) efficient concerns for status are such that δ1 = δ2 = 0.
(ii) The upper bound on a firm’s profit is equal to its profit in the benchmark case.
Proposition 5 tells us that status concerns on the part of agents cannot generate a higher surplus
than in the benchmark model. If δ1 = δ2 = 0, we are back to the standard moral-hazard case
and there are no distortions other than those caused by moral hazard. Constrained Pareto-efficiency
requires status payoff within the firm to be zero (zero-sum), not just status which is always zero-sum.
This solution arises since only material payoffs matter for fitness. Any effort devoted to acquiring
status is thus a waste from society’s point of view - while increased effort does increase output (and
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revenue), it also increases the disutility from effort (at an increasing rate).20 Status concerns thus
introduce an additional source of inefficiency in the agency relationship.21 The efficient solution thus
eliminates the inefficiency introduced by concerns for status. The standard model thus depicts a
(second) best-case scenario - a benchmark.22 We thus have the following corollary to Proposition 5.
Corollary 3 Inefficiency of the Equilibrium Status Concerns
With a diverse workforce, non-trivial status concerns are inefficient; in general, they reduce total
surplus generated within the firm relative to the standard moral-hazard model.
In this simple model, we can calculate the differences from the benchmark model explicitly. Material
surplus is lower in equilibrium than in the benchmark case,
MS −MSB = −2[k1σ
2
1ψ2 − k2σ22ψ1]2
9k1k2ψ1ψ2[k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
< 0.
A lower total surplus combined with positive shares for both agents (MAi > 0) automatically
implies that the firm’s share of the surplus, i.e., its profit is reduced. The firm’s profit is lower in
equilibrium relative to its benchmark profit, i.e., the profit that it would have earned with atomistic
agents. In this simple model, we can also explicitly calculate the difference in firm profit,
CEP − CEPB = −4[k1σ
2
1ψ2 − k2σ22ψ1]2
9k1k2ψ1ψ2[k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
< 0.
Propositions 2 through 4 say that the material utilities of agents are increasing in the difference
in the agents’ characteristics. Combined with Proposition 5, this implies that as the difference in
agent characteristics increases, a greater share of the already reduced surplus is transferred to the
agents, i.e., the firm’s share of the surplus is decreasing in the difference in agent characteristics. The
principal’s loss due to surplus transfer is thus minimized when the difference in agent characteristics
is minimized, i.e., when agents are identical in all respects.
Proposition 6 Effect of a Diverse Workforce on Firm Profits
(i) With a diverse workforce, agents’ choices of status concerns, in general, strictly lower the firm’s
profit relative to the benchmark case.
(ii) The firm’s share of the surplus is decreasing in workforce diversity.
(ii) If a firm could hire workers who are identical in all fundamental characteristics, i.e., r1 = r2,
k1 = k2, and σ
2
1 = σ
2
2, then it can guarantee itself the entire surplus.
20Note that this is a result of (weakly) decreasing returns to scale in production and convex effort costs. When the
production technology displays increasing returns to scale, these results may not hold.
21We can see that marginal cost of effort is kiei and the “true” or “real” marginal benefit is βi. In the presence
of status concerns, the marginal benefit is βi + δi. Status concerns thus drive a wedge between marginal benefit and
cost, thus causing an inefficiency.
22If the principal were forced to offer contracts of the form wi = αi + βiqi, i.e., if he were forced to choose
γ1 = γ2 = 0, then the efficient status concerns are unequal and non-zero. In this case, status concerns have some
social value and serve as substitutes for relative compensation schemes. However, firms have the freedom to design
their compensation schemes and γ1 and γ2 allow the firms to counter the effects of status on surplus extraction. Also,
from the solution to the principal’s problem above, we can see that the principal prefers to choose γ1, γ2 6= 0. We thus
assume that the principal is allowed the use of relative compensation schemes.
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Part (i) of Proposition 6 implies that a firm can never gain from the relative social concerns (rivalry
in Ku¨pper and Sandner 2008) of its workers when the workers can choose the intensity of their rivalry.
In particular, the firm cannot rely on the potential incentive properties of status to generate higher
profits. The reasons for this result were already presented in the discussion in the previous section.
Parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 6 say that a sufficient condition for a firm to prevent any surplus
transfer to the workers is that workers are identical in all respects. In this case, the equilibrium
choices of status concerns of both agents are zero (see the expressions for the equilibrium status
concerns). When workers are identical, the expected outputs of both agents are equal and thus
their expected status payoffs are zero. Agents cannot reduce their behavior utility by their choices
of status concerns and hence cannot force the principal to increase their material utilities. By
hiring a homogeneous workforce, a firm can remove the possibility that agents can substitute explicit
incentives for status, i.e., avoid being “exploited” by its workers.
Based on Proposition 6, it is tempting to conclude that a firm would do well to, if it could, hire
identical agents. However, the earlier results only make statements about the loss due to surplus
transfer to its workers. Hiring identical agents may not be the best solution from the point of view
of maximizing profit. Hiring identical agents who are both extremely risk-averse or both have high
effort costs leads to a decrease in productive effort and/or an increase in the wage payments. While
the principal keeps the entire surplus, his profits are, reduced. Thus, in making hiring decisions, the
firm must tradeoff the reduction in profit due to surplus extraction with the reduction in profit due
to higher wage payments. It is thus possible that a firm might still prefer to hire a diverse workforce
even if it leads to surplus extraction. The next result characterizes the condition under which a firm
would prefer a homogeneous workforce to a diverse one.
To keep things simple, for the rest of the paper, we assume that agents can differ in only one
respect - the cost of effort k. Thus, r1 = r2 = r and σ
2
1 = σ
2
2 = σ
2. We also assume that k ∈ {k1, k2}
and, without loss of generality, k1 > k2, i.e., there are only two types of workers. Once again, we
assume that σ12 = 0 since correlation in production plays no role in the analysis. The equilibrium
profit with a diverse workforce is
CEPD =
k21rσ
2(2 + k1rσ
2) + 34k1k2(1 + k2rσ
2) + k22(1 + k2rσ
2)2 + k21[1 + 34k2rσ
2(1 + k2rσ
2)]
18k1k2(1 + k1rσ2)(1 + k2rσ2)[k1(1 + k1rσ2) + k2(1 + k2rσ2)]
> 0,
(20)
while the equilibrium profit (also equal to the benchmark profit) with a homogeneous workforce is
CEPH =
1
k(1 + krσ2)
> 0. (21)
where k is the cost of effort of both agents. The tradeoff mentioned above is clear from the fact that
the above expression is decreasing in k. It is a well-known result in agency theory that the higher an
agent’s effort cost, the higher the wage payment required to induce participation and, hence, lower
the firm’s profit.
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Proposition 7 Firm’s Preference for Workforce Diversity
A firm would prefer to hire a homogeneous work force if and only if it could hire the more able
workers, i.e., iff k = k2.
This result is intuitive and is a result of the tradeoff mentioned above. When k = k1, the reduced
share of the total surplus with a diverse workforce is still greater than the entire surplus generated
with a homogeneous workforce. However, when k = k2, the total surplus is greater than the total
surplus generated with a diverse workforce. Note that this result depends only on the assumption
that there is a difference between k1 and k2 and does not depend on the magnitude of the difference.
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While it is not surprising that firms prefer workers of high ability, this result merely points out
that firms must make hiring decisions based on agents’ fundamental characteristics, i.e., their risk-
aversion, cost of effort and the variability of their production processes. Endogeneity of status
concerns implies that a firm’s decision to hire a homogeneous or diverse workforce cannot be based
on the agents’ concerns for status themselves, as in Fershtman et. al. (2006) and Ku¨pper and
Sandner (2008).
5 Conclusion
The model presented in this paper provides an explanation for the development of status concerns
by workers in a firm. In the context of a simple static linear principal-agent model, this model shows
that it is individually rational for agents to develop and exhibit relative concerns for status even in
a static interaction where common knowledge can be expected to hold. By their choices of social
concerns, agents are able to transfer surplus from the firm to themselves. As a result, the firm’s
profit is lowered relative to the benchmark model with atomistic agents. Surprisingly, we find that
it is the firm that is “exploited” by the agents in the presence of status concerns.
The agents’ choices of status concerns are influenced by their relative strengths and weaknesses
(vis-a`-vis each other) and by environmental factors. The “weaker” agent finds it in his interest to
display competitive relative concerns while the “stronger” agent finds it rational to display pro-social
relative concerns similar to altruism. The weaker agent is able to extract a contract that offers a
“significantly” higher wage payment while the stronger agent is able to extract a contract that calls
for “significantly” lower effort. By doing so, agents are able to extract surplus from the principal,
thus increasing their material utilities. The model in this paper therefore provides theoretical support
for Levine’s (1998) conclusion that agents care about who they interact with.
The model generates predictions about human behavior that are in line with what we generally
observe in human society. We would expect a person to feel pro-social concerns towards those who
23The results are the same if we allow agents to differ in a characteristic other than the cost of effort. The important
thing is that we can only allow agents to differ in one respect to be able to make any meaningful statements. In all
cases, the firm prefers a homogeneous workforce if and only if it is able to hire both agents who are of the “strong”
type.
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are less able than himself or those who work in a more uncertain environment than himself. We
would also expect a person to compete more vigorously with those he considers more able than
himself. It is thus possible that a similar model can explain human behavior in other contexts where
relative performance might matter. However, by only looking at local status, the model abstracts
away from agents’ choices of reference groups, an avenue that we intend to pursue in further work.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1:
(i) To begin with, we ignore the constraint that the principal’s expected profit is non-negative and
verify that it is satisfied in equilibrium. Since the contract is chosen so that the IR constraints bind,
the equilibrium status concerns solve the following problems:
max
{δ1∈R}
MA1 = −δ1(e1 − e2) = −δ1
(
(1 + δ1 − δ2)σ22
k1ψ2
− (1− δ1 + δ2)σ
2
1
k2ψ1
)
max
{δ2∈R}
MA2 = −δ2(e2 − e1) = −δ2
(
(1− δ1 + δ2)σ21
k2ψ1
− (1 + δ1 − δ2)σ
2
2
k1ψ2
)
MAi is strictly concave in δi and we have a unique interior equilibrium. Solving the two FOC
simultaneously, we have
δ1 =
k1σ
2
1ψ2 − k2σ22ψ1
3 [k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
and δ2 =
−k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ22ψ1
3 [k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
. (A.1)
At the equilibrium, e1, e2 and CEP > 0 and, as we would expect, the material utilities of both
agents are positive:
MA1 = MA2 =
[k1σ
2
1ψ2 − k2σ22ψ1]2
9k1k2ψ1ψ2[k1σ21ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1]
> 0 (= MAB1 = MA
B
2 ).
This is important since if agent k received negative material utility, he would choose δk = 0 which
would guarantee him zero material utility. Since CEP > 0 in equilibrium, we have a principal-agent
relationship. Thus, the profit constraint is non-binding in equilibrium, i.e., the principal’s profit
constraint is non-binding in equilibrium. Assumption 1 guarantees that β1, β2 > 0 in equilibrium.
Unless k1σ
2
1ψ2−k2σ22ψ1 = 0, we have δ1 6= δ2 6= 0. Thus, in general, agents choose to display unequal
and non-zero status concerns.
(ii) Further, we have δ1 = −δ2 (⇒MA1 = MA2).
Proof of Proposition 2:
(i) From the above expressions, we can see that
δi > (<)0 ⇔ σ2i > (<)σ2j .
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(ii) Since δ1 = −δ2, we focus, without loss of generality on δ1.
∂δ1
∂σ1
=
4krσ1(1 + krσ
2
2)
3[2 + kr(σ21 + σ
2
2)]
2
> 0 ⇒ ∂δ2
∂σ1
< 0 and
∂δ1
∂σ2
=
−krσ22(1 + krσ21)
3[2 + kr(σ21 + σ
2
2)]
2
< 0⇒ ∂δ2
∂σ2
> 0.
(iii) Recall that, at equilibrium, MA1 = MA2. Hence, we state the comparative statics in terms of
MA1. In this case, MA1 =
kr2(σ21−σ22)2
9(1+krσ21)(1+krσ
2
2)[2+kr(σ
2
1+σ
2
2)]
and
sign
(
∂MA1
∂σ1
)
= sign(σ21 − σ22) and
sign
(
∂MA1
∂σ2
)
= −sign(σ21 − σ22).
If σ21 − σ22 > 0, an increase in σ1 or a decrease in σ2 imply that there is an increase in the difference
between the production uncertainties of the two tasks. The above comparative statics then imply
that there is an increase in MA1, and hence in MA2. If σ
2
1 − σ22 < 0, a decrease in σ1 or an increase
in σ2 imply that there is an increase in the difference between the production uncertainties of the
two tasks. Once again, the comparative statics imply that material utilities are increasing in the
difference between the production uncertainties of the two tasks.
Proof of Proposition 3:
(i) From the above expressions for δ1 and δ2, it is clear that
δi > (<)0 ⇔ ri > (<)rj .
(ii) Since δ1 = −δ2, we focus, without loss of generality on δ1.
∂δ1
∂r1
=
2kσ2(1 + kr2σ
2)
3[2 + kσ2(r1 + r2)]2
> 0 ⇒ ∂δ2
∂r1
< 0 and
∂δ1
∂r2
=
−2kσ2(1 + kr1σ2)
3[2 + kσ2(r1 + r2)]2
< 0⇒ ∂δ2
∂r2
> 0.
(iii) Recall that, at equilibrium, MA1 = MA2. Hence, we state the comparative statics in terms of
MA1. In this case, MA1 =
kσ2(r1−r2)2
9(1+kr1σ2)(1+kr2σ2)[2+kσ2(r1+r2)]
and
sign
(
∂MA1
∂r1
)
= sign(r1 − r2) and
sign
(
∂MA1
∂r2
)
= −sign(r1 − r2).
Using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 2, the comparative statics imply
that material utilities are increasing in the difference between the coefficients of risk-aversion of the
two agents.
25
Proof of Proposition 4:
(i) From the above expressions for δi and δj , it is clear that
δi > (<)0 ⇔ ki > (<)kj .
(ii) Since δ1 = −δ2, we focus, without loss of generality on δ1.
∂δ1
∂k1
=
2k2(1 + 2k1rσ
2)(1 + k2rσ
2)
3[(k1 + k2) + rσ2(k21 + k
2
2)]
2
> 0 ⇒ ∂δ2
∂k1
< 0 and
∂δ1
∂k2
=
−2k1(1 + k1rσ2)(1 + 2k2rσ2)
3[(k1 + k2) + rσ2(k21 + k
2
2)]
2
< 0 ⇒ ∂δ2
∂k2
> 0.
(iii) Recall that, at equilibrium, MA1 = MA2. Hence, we state the comparative statics in terms of
MA1. In this case, MA1 =
(k1−k2)2[1+rσ2(k1+k2)]2
9k1k2(1+k1rσ2)(1+k2rσ2)[(k1+k2)+rσ2(k21+k
2
2)]
and
sign
(
∂MA1
∂k1
)
= sign(k1 − k2) and
sign
(
∂MA1
∂k2
)
= −sign(k1 − k2).
Using arguments similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 2, the comparative statics imply
that material utilities are increasing in the difference between the effort costs of the two agents.
Proof of Proposition 5:
(i) The efficient concerns for status are those values of δ1 and δ2 that maximize the total material
surplus. Under the present definition of status, material surplus (MS) is defined as follows
MS = e1 + e2 − k1e
2
1
2
− r1V1
2
− k2e
2
2
2
− r2V2
2
=
1
2
(1− (δ1 − δ2)2)
[
k1σ
2
1ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1
]
k1k2ψ1ψ2
.
The first-order necessary conditions are
∂MS
∂δ1
≤ 0 and ∂MS
∂δ2
≤ 0.
In this case, ∂MS∂δ1 = −∂MS∂δ2 . So, the FOC imply ∂MS∂δ1 = −∂MS∂δ2 ≤ 0 and ∂MS∂δ2 ≤ 0, both of which
can be satisfied only if ∂MS∂δ2 = 0 = −∂MS∂δ2 . We now have one equation in two variables. Thus, we
can only solve for δi in terms of δj . This gives
δ1 = δ2. (A.2)
The above argument says that any candidate for a maximum must satisfy the above condition. The
Hessian is always zero and we could have problems with local maxima. But, at a candidate solution,
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the material surplus is independent of status concerns:
MS =
1
2
[
k1σ
2
1ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1
]
k1k2ψ1ψ2
.
The material surplus at any local maximum is the same, thus implying that every candidate is a
global maximizer. We thus have multiple global maxima given by δ1 = δ2.
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However, when δ1 = δ2 6= 0, MA1 = −MA2 6= 0. This implies that one agent gets negative
material utility at the efficient level of status concerns. From a Pareto-efficiency point of view, this
is not acceptable; MA1 = MA2 = 0 in the benchmark model. Thus, the constrained Pareto-efficient
status concerns are such that δi = δ2 = 0.
(ii) When δ1 = δ2 = 0, we are back to the benchmark model with no status concerns.
Proof of Proposition 7:
From the expressions for CEPH and CEPD, we have the following.
If k = k1 (where k is the cost of effort of both agents in the homogeneous case),
sign(CEPH − CEPD) = sign(k2 − k1), and
if k = k2,
sign(CEPH − CEPD) = sign(k1 − k2).
Given the assumption that k1 > k2, the result follows.
B Appendix: Benchmark Model with No Status Concerns
We present the results from the benchmark static moral-hazard model where agents do not have
status concerns for purposes of comparison. The results from this model represent the second-best
since there is an inefficiency due to moral hazard.
The benchmark model is one where δi = δj = 0, i, j = 1, 2. Absent status concerns, agent i’s
utility function is given by
U iA = − exp{−ri(αi + βiei + γiej −
kie
2
i
2
+ (βii + γij))}
with associated certainty equivalent
CEAi = αi + βiei + γiej − kie
2
i
2
− ri
2
(β2i σ
2
i + 2βiγiσ12 + γ
2
i σ
2
j ), i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Note that agent i’s material utility is equal to his behavior utility. Agent i’s problem is to maximize
CEAi with respect to ei and effort choice is given by
ei =
βi
ki
, i = 1, 2.
24We can put to rest any worries about a candidate being a global minimum. It is possible to find values of δ1 and
δ2 that give negative values for MS, for instance δ1 = −3 and δ2 = 0.
25The above is just a “formal” mathematical argument. From even a cursory glance at MS, we can see that it is
maximized when δ1 = δ2.
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Note that agent i’s effort is increasing in incentives βi.
The principal’s problem is to maximize CEP (given by (9)) subject to the (binding) individual
rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints. The solution is
βBi =
σ2j
ψj
∈ [0, 1] and γBi =
−σ12
ψj
T 0 ⇔ σ12 S 0,
where
ψi ≡ σ2i + kjrj(σ21σ22 − σ212) > 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (B.1)
At the solution, the effort levels are given by
eB1 =
σ22
k1ψ2
> 0 and eB2 =
σ21
k2ψ1
> 0, (B.2)
and the wages received by the agents are given by
wB1 =
σ22
2k1ψ2
> 0 and wB2 =
σ21
2k2ψ1
> 0. (B.3)
The total surplus at the equilibrium (equal to the firm’s profit since the IR constraints bind) is given
by
MSB = ProfitB = CEPB =
1
2
[
k1σ
2
1ψ2 + k2σ
2
2ψ1
]
k1k2ψ1ψ2
> 0. (B.4)
Note that in the benchmark model, the material payoff of an agent is equal to his behavior payoff.
The binding IR constraint implies that the material utility of an agent is zero in the benchmark case,
i.e., MAB1 = MA
B
2 = 0.
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